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1. Introduction  
With a growing concern regarding security, interest in biometrics is increasing. Since 
biometrics utilizes a user’s physiological or behavioral characteristic, which is unique and 
immutable, the compromise of biometric templates is a serious problem. Fingerprint 
authentication system is one of the most widely used biometric authentication systems. In 
general, in the enrollment procedure, the features are extracted from the enrollment image 
and are stored as a template. The template is compared to the features extracted from the 
verification image. Unlike passwords, however, biometrics has no or little substitutions. For 
example, if one’s fingerprint template is compromised, he or she cannot use that fingerprint 
for any other fingerprint authentication system from then on. 
Ratha et al. have introduced cancelable biometrics as a remedy for the problem of 
compromised templates (Bolle et al., 2002; Ratha et al., 2001). Cancelable biometrics distorts 
or transforms a user’s template using some non-invertible functions to obscure the user’s 
raw physical characteristics, and its matching is performed in a transformed domain. When 
a template is compromised, a new biometric template is issued (like a new enrollment of a 
new user) by distorting the biometric traits in a different way using a new instance of the 
non-invertible function. Ratha et al. proposed the surface folding scheme for cancelable 
fingerprint templates (Ratha et al., 2007). They proposed a one-way transformation which 
moves minutia positions using two-dimensional Gaussian functions defined over the feature 
domain. However, if an attacker obtains two transformed templates and transformation 
parameters, the original template is recovered by a dictionary attack (Shin et al., 2009). 
Fuzzy vault is a crypto-biometric algorithm proposed by Juels et al. (Juels & Sudan, 2002). It 
gives a promising solution to personal privacy and fingerprint template security problems. 
Clancy et al. and Uludag et al. suggested the method for applying the fuzzy vault to 
fingerprint authentication, which is named as fuzzy fingerprint vault (Clancy et al, 2003; 
Uludag et al., 2005). It generates a lot of chaff minutiae and mixes them up with the real 
minutiae. Then, the real minutiae are projected on a randomly generated polynomial, and 
the chaff minutiae are projected off the polynomial. The polynomial is successfully 
reconstructed using either brute-force search or Reed-Solomon code if a sufficient number of 
real minutiae are chosen. The genuine user can choose a sufficient number of real minutiae 
by presenting his or her fingerprint while the impostors cannot. Some researchers have 
implemented the fuzzy vault for fingerprints, and have protected the fingerprint minutiae 
by adding chaff points into the vault (Chung et al., 2006; Clancy et al., 2003; Dodis et al., 
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2004; Kanak & Sogukpinar, 2007; Nandakumar et al., 2007; Uludag et al., 2005). Lagrange 
interpolation (Hildebrand, 1987) is the most widely used polynomial interpolation method. 
However, it requires a little much time especially when the degree of polynomial is large. 
Brute-force search is employed for polynomial reconstruction attempts until the true 
polynomial is reconstructed, and Lagrange interpolation is used to interpolate the 
polynomial. Therefore, even if the real minutiae are chosen more than the degree of the 
polynomial, the brute-force search cannot reconstruct the polynomial in real-time when 
several chaff minutiae are chosen along with the real minutiae. All the previous results 
adopted the brute-force search to reconstruct the polynomial or skipped the procedure for 
polynomial reconstruction because of its difficulty (Li et al., 2006). In this work we propose a 
fast algorithm for polynomial reconstruction. To reduce the execution time, it determines 
the candidate sets with chaff points by using the Gaussian elimination and excludes them 
from the reconstruction trial. Since the Gaussian elimination is a time-consuming process, 
we have found a recursive formula to perform the Gaussian elimination effectively by using 
the Consistency Theorem (Anton, 1994). We confirmed that the proposed algorithm can be 
performed in real time even at the worst case. 
There are a few attack methods on the fuzzy vault. Scheirer et al. suggested the methods of 
attacks against fuzzy vault including the attack via record multiplicity, which is known as 
the correlation attack (Scheirer & Boult, 2007). The correlation attack gives very powerful 
attack method when two fuzzy vaults obtained from the same fingerprint are available. On 
the other hand, when only one fuzzy vault is compromised and no additional information is 
available, brute-force attack can be used. Brute-force attack is employed for polynomial 
reconstruction attempts using the random combination of points until the true polynomial is 
reconstructed. In this work we propose a new attack algorithm which applies a fast 
polynomial reconstruction algorithm based on the Consistency Theorem. Also, we evaluate 
the proposed attack method, and compare it with the known attack methods such as the 
brute-force attack and the correlation attack.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The conventional fingerprint authentication methods 
are described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the fuzzy fingerprint vault system and the 
proposed polynomial reconstruction algorithm followed by experimental results. In Section 
4, various attack methods for fuzzy fingerprint vault (brute-force attack, correlation attack, 
and the fast polynomial reconstruction attack) and the experimental results are explained. 
Section 5 summarizes the conclusion. 
2. Fingerprint authentication 
Fingerprint recognition is the most common biometric method for authentication. Since 
everyone’s fingerprint is unique and invariable during life, fingerprint has been used as the 
evidence of forensic science and the personal authentication method. Modern fingerprint 
recognition began in 1684, when Nehemiah Grew studied and described ridges, furrows 
and pores on hand and foot surfaces. In the late 1960s, the Live-Scan system which records 
fingerprints electronically was developed, which was a turning point of fingerprint 
recognition. Fingerprint was centralized into database, and the automatic fingerprint 
recognition system has been developed consistently. 
A fingerprint authentication system consists of fingerprint sensor, pre-processing, feature 
extraction, storage, and matching as shown in Fig. 1. The fingerprint pattern is captured by a 
fingerprint sensor. A fingerprint sensor takes a snapshot of a fingerprint and saves it into an 
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image file. From the image, unique features of each fingerprint are extracted and saved in 
the storage. The storage may be either a central database or a smartcard. Before feature 
extraction, pre-processing is performed to extract the reliable features from the image. For 
fingerprint matching, features of an input fingerprint are compared to the features of the 
enrolled fingerprint data. By comparing similarity between two fingerprint feature sets, it is 
decided whether the two fingerprints are from the same person or not. 
The fingerprint recognition algorithms can be classified into two categories: image-based 
and minutiae-based. Image-based methods are based on optical correlation and transform 
based features. The image-based methods lack the ability to track with variations in 
position, scale, and orientation angle, and hence, they cannot give reliable recognition 
accuracy. Nevertheless, the image-based methods have been studied continuously because 
of the following properties (Nanni & Lumini, 2009; Yang & Park, 2008). First, the image-
based methods can be combined with the minutiae-based methods to improve the 
accuracies of the fingerprint authentication systems. Second, fingerprint features can be 
represented by a fixed length vector, which is suitable for various learning systems. 
Minutiae-based methods are more popular matching techniques, which are included in 
almost all contemporary fingerprint identification and verification systems. They are based 
on the minutiae, such as ending, bifurcation, and singular points in the fingerprint, which 
have been known to be effective for fingerprint recognition. The minutiae form a pattern of 
points, and hence several well-known point pattern matching algorithms have been 
proposed in the late 80’s.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the fingerprint authentication system (Pan et al., 2003) 
A fingerprint authentication system has two phases: enrollment and verification. In the off-
line enrollment phase, an enrolled fingerprint image is preprocessed, and the minutiae are 
extracted and stored. In the on-line verification phase, the similarity between the enrolled 
minutiae and the input minutiae is examined.  
Image preprocessing refers to the refinement of the fingerprint image against the image 
distortion (poor contrast, flaw, smudge, etc.) obtained from a fingerprint sensor. Minutiae 
Extraction refers to the extraction of features from the fingerprint image. After this step, 
some of the minutiae are detected and stored into a pattern file, which includes the position, 
the orientation, and the type (ridge ending or bifurcation) of the minutiae.  
The input fingerprint minutiae are compared with the enrolled fingerprint minutiae. 
Actually, Minutiae Matching is composed of the alignment stage and the matching stage. In 
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order to match two fingerprints captured with unknown direction and position, the 
differences of the direction and the position between two fingerprints should be detected, 
and alignment between them needs to be executed. Therefore, in the alignment stage, 
transformations such as translation and rotation between two fingerprints are estimated, 
and two minutiae are aligned according to the estimated parameters. If alignment is 
performed accurately, the matching stage is referred to point matching simply. In the 
matching stage, two minutiae are compared based on their position, orientation, and type. 
Then, a matching score is computed. 
3. Fuzzy fingerprint vault 
3.1 Enrollment procedure 
Fig. 2 shows the block diagram of the enrollment procedure of the Fuzzy Fingerprint Vault 
(FFV) system. Given the fingerprint image to be enrolled, we first extract minutiae from the 
image to form a locking set of the form. 
 { |1 }i eL i n= ≤ ≤m  (1) 
where ( , , , )i i i i ix y tθ=m  is the i-th enrollment minutia, and ne is the number of the 
enrollment minutiae. Then, a number of chaff minutiae are generated and constitute a 
minutia set along with the real minutiae. After adding the chaff minutiae, the total number 
of minutiae is nr. All arithmetic operations are conducted in a finite field of order 220, namely 
GF(220). Thus, each coordinate is scaled to the range [0, 1024] for the purpose of the 
arithmetic in GF(220). A finite field (Stallings, 2005) is a field with a finite number of 
elements, also called a Galois field. All operations performed in the finite field result in an 
element within that field. For polynomial representation, we define the finite field over the 
irreducible polynomial x20 + x3 + 1. Then, we randomly select (k + 1) elements from GF(220) 
and generate a k-degree polynomial as follows. 
 20 1 2( )
k
kp u a a u a u a u= + + + +A  (2) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the enrollment procedure of the FFV system (Choi et al., 2009) 
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This polynomial becomes the secret to be protected. As in the work of Uludag et al., we 
concatenate x and y coordinates of a minutia to arrive at the locking/unlocking data unit u. 
Then, we project the real and the chaff points (i.e., minutiae) on and off the polynomial, 
respectively. That is, 
 
i
i
( ) if  is real
( ) if  is chaff
i
i
i i
p u u
v
p u uδ
⎧⎪= ⎨ +⎪⎩
 (3) 
where δi is a non-zero element of GF(220). Finally, the vault is constituted by the real and the 
chaff points, and the secret. The secret should be stored in a hashed form, instead of in the 
clear form. 
3.2 Verification procedure 
Fig. 3 shows the block diagram of the verification procedure of the FFV system. Given the 
fingerprint image to be verified, the minutiae are first extracted from the image and the 
verification minutiae set V is denoted by 
 { |1 }i vV i n= ≤ ≤m#  (4) 
where ( , , , )i i i i ix y tθ=m # ## # #  is the i-th verification minutia, and nv is the number of the 
verification minutiae. Then, the verification minutiae are compared with the enrolled 
minutiae with real and chaff minutiae mixed, and an unlocking set U is finally selected. 
 { |1 }i mU i n= ≤ ≤m  (5) 
where nm is the number of the matched minutiae. The vault can be successfully unlocked 
only if U overlaps with L to a great extent.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Block diagram of the verification procedure of the FFV system (Choi et al., 2009) 
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These nm points may contain some chaff points as well as the real points even if the user is 
genuine. Hence, in order to interpolate the k-degree polynomial, we have to select (k + 1) 
real points from among the nm points. After the polynomial is interpolated, it is compared 
with the true polynomial stored in the vault. A decision to accept/reject the user depends on 
the result of this comparison. If |U ∩ L| ≥ (k + 1), the k-degree polynomial can be 
successfully reconstructed by using the brute-force search. The most widely used algorithm 
for polynomial interpolation is the Lagrange interpolation. The number of cases that select (k 
+ 1) minutiae from nm minutiae is C(nm, k + 1). Let nreal be the number of real minutiae in set 
U, then the number of cases that correctly reconstruct the polynomial is C(nreal, k + 1). 
Therefore, the average number of polynomial interpolation is 
 
( , 1)
( , 1)
m
real
C n k
C n k
+
+  (6) 
Furthermore, when a higher degree of polynomial is used, the Lagrange interpolation needs 
much more time to reconstruct the polynomial. More precisely, it can be done in O(k log2(k)) 
operations (Gathen & Gerhardt, 2003). Hence, it becomes impracticable as nm and/or k 
increases. So, Uludag used only 18 minutiae to prevent nm from being too large (Uludag et 
al., 2005). 
Juels et al. suggested that the chaff points can be removed by means of the Reed-Solomon 
decoding algorithm (Juels & Sudan, 2002). Among various realizations of the Reed-Solomon 
code, we used the Gao’s algorithm (Gao, 2003), which is one of the fastest Reed-Solomon 
decoding algorithms. It compensates one chaff point at the cost of one real point, so if there 
are many chaff points are matched along with real points, it is quite probable that the right 
user is rejected (i.e., false negative). The situation becomes much more serious when the 
degree of polynomial increases. 
3.3 Polynomial reconstruction  
If the matched point set of equation (5) contains more than (k + 1) real point, the true 
polynomial can be reconstructed by using the brute-force search. Brute-force search chooses 
(k + 1) points from among nm points and tries to reconstruct the k-degree polynomial using 
the Lagrange interpolation, which requires a relatively large number of computations. So, 
when the matched point set contains many chaff minutiae, the number of the Lagrange 
interpolation to be performed increases exponentially, and hence, the polynomial 
reconstruction cannot be performed in real time.  
In this section, we introduce a fast algorithm for the polynomial reconstruction (Choi et al., 
2008). To begin with, let us consider the following theorem which provides the conditions 
under which a linear system of m equations in n unknowns is guaranteed to be consistent. 
 
 
 
Let us consider a linear system of (k + 2) equations with (k + 1) unknowns. 
Consistency Theorem. If Ax = b is a linear system of m equations with n unknowns, 
then the followings are equivalent. 
(a) Ax = b is consistent. 
(b) b is in the column space of A. 
(c) The coefficient matrix A and the augmented matrix [A | b] have the same rank. 
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 ⋅ =U a v  (7) 
where 
 
2
1 1 1 0 1
2
1 22 2 2
2
22 2 2
1
1
, ,
1
k
k
k
k kk k k
u u u a v
a vu u u
a vu u u ++ + +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= = =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
U a v
A
A
B BB B B D B
A
 (8) 
Then, the corresponding augmented matrix W is of the form. 
 
2
1 1 1 1
2
2 2 2 2
1
1
k
k
k k k k
u u u v
u u u v+ + + +
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
W
A
B B B D B B
A
 (9) 
It is straightforward that the rank of matrix U is (k + 1). According to the Consistency 
Theorem, the rank of the augmented matrix W must be equal to (k + 1) to guarantee that the 
linear system has a solution. The Gaussian elimination was used to check whether the 
augmented matrix had rank (k + 1) or not. The elementary row operations, provided we do 
not perform the operation of interchanging two rows, were used to reduce the augmented 
matrix W into the row-echelon form. 
 
2
1 1 1 1
2(2) (2) (2)
2 2 2
(3) (3)
3 3
( 1)
1
( 2)
2
1
0 1
0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
u u u v
u u v
u v
v
v
+
+
+
+
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
A
A
A
B B B D B B
A
A
 (10) 
where ( )l iju  and 
( )i
jv  are the values of 
l
ju  and vj when the j-th row has “leading 1” at the i-th 
element, respectively. Note that the diagonal elements of equation (10) cannot be zero 
because the rank of matrix U is (k + 1). From the parts (a) and (c) of the Consistency 
Theorem, it follows that if ( 2)2 0
k
kv
+
+ ≠ , the linear system of equation (7) does not have a 
solution. Hence, there exists at least one chaff point in the set {(ui, vi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 2}, and we 
need not perform the polynomial reconstruction process. On the contrary, if ( 2)2 0
k
kv
+
+ = , then 
all the points are probably the real points. Thus, we try to reconstruct the polynomial with (k 
+ 1) points and compare it with the true polynomial. 
Up to this point, we have explained how to reconstruct a k-degree polynomial from (k + 2) 
matched minutiae. In general, the unlocking set has nm minutiae, so let us consider a linear 
system of nm equations with (k + 1) unknowns as follows. 
 
2
11 1 1 0
2
22 2 2 1
2
1
1
1
mm m m
k
k
k
nn n n k
vu u u a
vu u u a
vu u u a
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
A
A
BB B B D B B
A
 (11) 
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where nm > (k + 1). Clearly, if nm < (k + 1), then the polynomial cannot be reconstructed. 
Also, if nm = (k + 1), we can reconstruct the polynomial with the (k + 1) points. Suppose that 
we select (k + 2) real points from among nm points, we can reconstruct the true polynomial. 
However, if at least one chaff point exists in the (k + 2) selected points the true polynomial 
cannot be reconstructed. The procedure for the proposed polynomial reconstruction 
algorithm is as follows. 
1. (k + 1) points are selected from among nm points with real and chaff points mixed, and 
these points are placed to the top of equation (11). 
2. The augmented matrix of equation (11) is obtained, and is reduced into the following 
row-echelon form. 
 
2
1 1 1 1
2(2) (2) (2)
2 2 2
(3) (3)
3 3
( 1)
1
( 2)
2
( 2)
1
0 1
0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
m
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
n
u u u v
u u v
u v
v
v
v
+
+
+
+
+
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
A
A
A
B B B D B B
A
A
B B B D B B
A
 (12) 
3. To determine whether the (k + 1) points (u1, v1),…,(uk+1, vk+1) are valid candidates or not, 
we will check the values of ( 2) ( 2)2 , , m
k k
k nv v
+ +
+ A . Therefore, the proposed algorithm needs one 
more real point than the brute-force search to reconstruct the polynomial. If there is at 
least one zero among ( 2) ( 2)2 , , m
k k
k nv v
+ +
+ A , we reconstruct the polynomial with the selected (k 
+ 1) points, and compare it with the true polynomial. 
4. Steps (1) ~ (3) are repeated until the true polynomial is reconstructed. 
However, the computations of the Gaussian elimination in step (2) take too much time to be 
implemented in real time. Fortunately, in order to obtain the values of ( 2) ( 2)2 , , m
k k
k nv v
+ +
+ A , we do 
not have to apply the Gaussian elimination. We have found the following recursive formula, 
so the computation time can be considerably reduced. 
 
( ) ( )( 1)
, 0
, 1, ,min( 1, 1)
j
i ii
j ij
j i
v i
v vv
i k j
u u
+
=⎧⎪ −= ⎨ = + −⎪ −⎩
A  (13) 
This gives exactly the same solution as the Gaussian elimination. The proof can be found on 
the reference (Choi et al., 2008). 
3.4 Experimental results  
To evaluate the performance of the proposed polynomial reconstruction algorithm, we used 
DB1 and DB2 of FVC2002 (Maio et al., 2002). The fingerprint images were obtained in three 
distinct sessions with at least two week time separating for each session. During the first 
session, the fingerprint images were obtained by placing the fingerprints with a normal 
position. During the second session, the fingerprint images were obtained by requesting the 
individuals to provide their fingerprints with exaggerated displacement and rotation (not to 
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exceed 35 degrees). During the third session, fingers were alternatively dried and 
moistened. The characteristics of the databases are listed in Table 1. The databases were 
obtained from the optical sensors. The size of fingerprint image of DB2 is greater than that 
of DB1. The resolutions of the databases are about 500 dpi. Each database consists of 100 
fingers, and 8 impressions per finger. Each sample was matched against the remaining 
samples of the same finger to compute the Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR). Similarly, the 
first sample of each finger was matched against the first sample of the remaining fingers to 
compute the False Acceptance Rate (FAR). If the matching g against h is performed, the 
symmetric one (i.e., h against g) is not executed to avoid the correlation. For each database, 
the number of genuine tests was 2800, whereas the number of impostor tests was 4950. All 
experiments were performed on a system with a 3.2 GHz processor.  
 
 DB1 DB2 
Sensor Type Optical Optical 
Image Size 388 × 374(142 Kpixels) 296 × 560(162 Kpixels) 
Resolution 500 dpi 569 dpi 
Sensor “TouchView II” by Identix “FX2000” by Biometrika 
No. Fingers 100 100 
No. Impressions 8 8 
Table 1. Characteristics of FVC2002 Databases 
 
Database 
No. Minutiae (ne) 
Average Min Max 
DB1 30.5 5 60 
DB2 39.0 7 89 
Table 2. The number of minutiae for FVC2002 Databases 
 
Database 
No. Chaff 
Minutiae 
Test 
No. Matched Minutiae (nm) Matching Time 
(sec) Total Real Chaff 
DB1 
200 
Genuine 19.7 18.8 0.9 0.76 
Impostor 9.3 3.3 5.9 0.87 
300 
Genuine 20.0 18.6 1.4 1.48 
Impostor 10.9 2.9 8.0 1.73 
400 
Genuine 20.4 18.4 2.0 2.45 
Impostor 12.3 2.5 9.8 2.89 
DB2 
200 
Genuine 24.3 23.4 0.9 1.26 
Impostor 10.6 4.3 6.3 1.64 
300 
Genuine 24.5 23.2 1.3 2.38 
Impostor 12.4 3.9 8.5 3.17 
400 
Genuine 24.9 23.1 1.8 3.87 
Impostor 13.9 3.4 10.5 5.26 
Table 3. Average number of matched minutiae and matching time for FVC2002 databases 
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To examine the effect of the insertion of chaff minutiae on the performance of a fingerprint 
recognition system, we selected the number of chaff minutiae as 200, 300 and 400. For each 
database the numbers of minutiae (average, minimum and maximum) are listed in Table 2. 
Since the images of DB2 are obtained from bigger sensor, more minutiae are extracted from 
DB2 than from DB1. Also, the average numbers of the matched minutiae according to the 
number of inserted chaff minutiae are listed in Table 3. The more chaff minutiae are added, 
the more minutiae are matched. In addition, the number of chaff minutiae increases while 
the number of real minutiae decreases slightly. Hence, we can predict that both of GAR and 
FAR will decrease as more chaff minutiae are added. Also, we can find that the matching 
time increases greatly as more chaff minutiae are added. 
 
Polynomial 
degree 
No. 
Chaff
FTER
Brute-force Proposed Reed-Solomon 
GAR FAR HTER GAR FAR HTER GAR FAR HTER 
7 
200 
0.3 
93.1 7.4 7.1 92.2 4.8 6.3 92.0 2.6 5.3 
300 92.3 5.4 6.6 91.3 3.1 5.9 90.8 1.1 5.1 
400 91.0 4.1 6.6 90.2 2.3 6.1 89.2 0.2 5.5 
8 
200 
0.6 
90.7 4.1 6.7 89.6 2.2 6.3 89.4 1.3 6.0 
300 90.2 3.1 6.4 89.0 1.5 6.2 88.3 0.5 6.1 
400 89.2 2.1 6.5 88.0 0.9 6.5 86.9 0.1 6.6 
9 
200 
1.3 
88.1 2.2 7.0 87.0 1.2 7.1 86.7 0.7 7.0 
300 87.9 1.2 6.7 86.6 0.5 7.0 86.0 0.1 7.1 
400 87.3 0.9 6.8 85.4 0.5 7.6 84.2 0.0 7.9 
10 
200 
1.9 
85.0 0.8 7.9 84.0 0.4 8.2 83.5 0.3 8.4 
300 84.7 0.6 8.0 83.5 0.2 8.3 82.6 0.0 8.7 
400 83.8 0.5 8.3 81.3 0.1 9.4 78.2 0.0 10.9 
11 
200 
2.6 
82.0 0.2 9.1 80.4 0.1 9.9 79.4 0.1 10.4 
300 81.7 0.3 9.3 79.2 0.1 10.5 76.8 0.0 11.6 
400 81.1 0.1 9.5 78.5 0.1 10.8 75.1 0.0 12.4 
12 
200 
3.1 
78.9 0.1 10.6 76.9 0.0 11.6 75.8 0.0 12.1 
300 78.5 0.1 10.8 75.9 0.0 12.1 72.9 0.0 13.5 
400 77.6 0.1 11.2 74.6 0.0 12.7 71.2 0.0 14.4 
Table 4. Recognition accuracies of the FFV system of FVC2002-DB1 (unit: %) 
To examine the effectiveness of the proposed polynomial reconstruction algorithm, we 
compare it with both the brute-force search and the Reed-Solomon code. The error rates of 
the FFV system for DB1 and DB2 are listed in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. During the 
enrollment, if the number of the fingerprint minutiae is less than or equal to the degree of 
the polynomial, the fingerprint is rejected to be enrolled. Failure To Enrollment Rate (FTER) 
is the ratio of the rejected fingerprints to the total fingerprints. The FTER of DB1 is much 
higher than that of DB2 since fewer minutiae are extracted from DB1. To compare the 
recognition accuracies of the three polynomial reconstruction algorithms, Genuine 
Acceptance Rate (GAR) and False Rejection Rate (FAR) are used. In addition, Half Total 
Error Rate (HTER) is adopted for the purpose of direct comparison (Poh & Bengio, 2006), 
which is the average of False Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance Rate (FAR). The 
values of GAR, FAR and HTER are obtained by excluding the fingerprints rejected at the 
enrollment phase. As predicted above, the more chaff minutiae is inserted, the lower both 
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GAR and FAR become. Since the proposed algorithm needs one more real minutia than the 
brute-force search, the recognition accuracy of the proposed algorithm using the k-degree 
polynomial should be exactly the same as that of the brute-force search using the (k + 1)-
degree polynomial. In practice, however, the polynomial could not always be reconstructed 
even if the real minutiae are matched more than the degree of polynomial because the 
polynomial reconstruction process will be stopped after a pre-determined number of 
iterations to prevent from going into an infinite loop. Furthermore, another reason is the 
difference in FTER due to the different degree of polynomial. The overall recognition rates 
of the three algorithms are comparable. The averages of HTER of the brute-force search, the 
proposed algorithm and the Reed-Solomon code for DB1 are 8.1%, 8.5% and 8.8%, 
respectively, and 6.1%, 5.8% and 5.4% for DB2. The Reed-Solomon code is better for low 
degree polynomials, and the brute-force search is better for high degree polynomials. 
 
Polynomial 
degree 
No. 
Chaff
FTER
Brute-force Proposed Reed-Solomon 
GAR FAR HTER GAR FAR HTER GAR FAR HTER 
7 
200 
0.3 
96.9 15.4 9.3 96.1 9.3 6.6 95.2 2.5 3.7 
300 96.3 11.3 7.5 95.3 7.0 5.8 94.2 1.1 3.5 
400 95.4 9.3 6.9 94.5 5.7 5.6 93.2 0.5 3.6 
8 
200 
0.3 
95.8 9.5 6.9 94.9 5.7 5.4 94.2 1.8 3.8 
300 95.1 6.8 5.9 94.3 4.2 4.9 93.3 0.6 3.7 
400 94.7 5.8 5.5 93.9 3.5 4.8 91.8 0.3 4.3 
9 
200 
0.4 
94.3 5.2 5.4 93.2 3.0 4.9 92.3 1.1 4.4 
300 94.2 4.3 5.1 93.2 2.5 4.7 91.7 0.4 4.3 
400 93.4 3.5 5.0 91.8 2.2 5.2 90.0 0.3 5.1 
10 
200 
0.7 
92.9 3.1 5.1 91.5 1.6 5.0 91.0 0.7 4.9 
300 92.3 2.5 5.1 90.6 1.5 5.4 89.2 0.3 5.6 
400 92.0 2.0 5.0 90.5 1.2 5.3 88.3 0.1 5.9 
11 
200 
0.9 
90.4 1.8 5.7 89.1 1.0 5.9 88.5 0.5 6.0 
300 89.9 1.1 5.6 88.5 0.6 6.1 86.8 0.1 6.7 
400 89.9 1.2 5.6 88.1 0.7 6.3 85.4 0.0 7.3 
12 
200 
1.0 
88.4 1.0 6.3 86.9 0.6 6.8 86.3 0.2 7.0 
300 88.0 0.7 6.4 86.1 0.5 7.2 84.6 0.1 7.8 
400 87.3 0.7 6.7 84.8 0.3 7.8 82.2 0.0 8.9 
Table 5. Recognition accuracies of the FFV system of FVC2002-DB2 (unit: %) 
Fig. 4 shows the execution times (average, min, max) and the average number of the 
Lagrange interpolations for the brute-force search, the proposed algorithm and the Reed-
Solomon code for FVC2002-DB1, respectively. Fig. 5 is the results of FVC2002-DB2. 
Although the Lagrange interpolation is an efficient technique to interpolate a polynomial, it 
requires more time. In the case of genuine tests, the average time of success is fast enough to 
be performed in real time. At the worst case, however, the brute-force search spends too 
much time because a huge number of the Lagrange interpolations are needed to reconstruct 
the true polynomial. On the other hand, the proposed algorithm and the Reed-Solomon 
code spend very little time even at the worst case. In our experiments, the Lagrange 
interpolation time for a 9-degree polynomial is 0.6 milliseconds, but in a certain case, it takes 
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more than 284 seconds because 425,415 interpolations are performed to reconstruct the 
polynomial.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Comparison of polynomial reconstruction time for the Brute-force search, the 
proposed algorithm, and the Reed-Solomon code (FVC2002-DB1) 
 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison of polynomial reconstruction time for the Brute-force search, the 
proposed algorithm, and the Reed-Solomon code (FVC2002-DB2) 
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4. Attack methods for fuzzy fingerprint vault 
The attack of FFV is selecting real points more than the degree of polynomial. The efficient 
attack methods are to constitute a minutia set that contains many real points and a little 
chaff points. If the set contains real points more than the degree of polynomial, the 
polynomial can be reconstructed by the brute-force search. In addition, if the set contains 
more chaff points, more time is needed to reconstruct the polynomial. The correlation attack 
(Kholmatov & Yanikoglu, 2008) is known to be an efficient method that constitutes the 
minutia set using multiple vaults enrolled for different applications. On the other hand, 
when multiple vaults cannot be obtained and no information about the minutiae is 
available, the attacker should select the real minutiae from among the entire points 
including many chaff points. 
4.1 Brute-force attack 
The brute-force attack (Paar et al., 2010) is a method used to extract the real minutiae from 
the vault when no information is available. It tries to reconstruct the polynomial by using all 
the possible combinations until the correct polynomial is found. Given the (k + 1) points, a k-
degree polynomial is uniquely determined, which is computed by the Lagrange 
interpolation. Lagrange interpolating polynomial p(x) of degree k that passes through (k + 1) 
points (x1, y1),…,(xk+1, yk+1) is given by 
 
1
1
( ) ( )
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i
i
p x p x
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This is written explicitly by 
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Recall that there are nr points in the vault, and among these points, ne points are real, and we 
want to reconstruct a k-degree polynomial. Then, the total number of trials which select (k + 
1) points from nr points is C(nr, k + 1), and C(ne, k + 1) combinations can reconstruct the true 
polynomial. If we can randomly select (k + 1) points and exclude the combination from the 
next selection, we need to try 0.5 × C(nr, k + 1) / C(ne, k + 1) times on the average. However, 
it requires too much memory to check whether the selected combination is used or not. For 
example, if nr = 230, ne = 7, and char (1 byte) type is used, then C(230, 8) ≈ 172 Terabytes, 
which is impossible to be allocated in RAM. Therefore, this attack can be seen as a Bernoulli 
trial with probability, 
 
( , 1)
( , 1)
e
r
C n k
C n k
+
+  (17) 
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Hence, let NL be the number of executions of the Lagrange interpolation until the correct 
polynomial is reconstructed, then, NL has the geometric distribution with mean, 
 
( , 1)
( )
( , 1)
r
L
e
C n k
E N
C n k
+= +  (18) 
In general, since nr is much greater than ne, this attack is time-consuming. For example, if nr 
= 230, ne = 30, and k = 9, then the average number of trials of the Lagrange interpolation is 
C(230, 10) / C(30, 10) ≈ 3 × 109. Even though the calculation of the Lagrange interpolation 
takes 1 millisecond, the attack will take about 36 days on the average. 
4.2 Correlation attack 
Scheirer et al. suggested the methods of attacks against fuzzy vault including the attack via 
record multiplicity, which is known as the correlation attack (Scheirer & Boult, 2007). Suppose 
that the attacker can obtain two vaults generated from the same fingerprint (different chaff 
minutiae and different polynomials), the real minutiae can be revealed by correlating two 
vaults. If the matching minutiae contain the real minutiae more than the degree of the 
polynomial, the true polynomial can be successfully reconstructed by the brute-force attack, 
and hence, all of the real minutiae will be revealed. In addition, even if the number of the 
real minutiae is larger than the degree of the polynomial, it would be computationally 
infeasible to reconstruct the polynomial when there are too many chaff minutiae in the 
matching minutiae with respect to the real minutiae.  
 
 
 a)  b) 
Fig. 6. Example of correlation attack. (a) shows the alignment of two vaults from the same 
fingerprint, and (b) from different fingerprints. (Kholmatov & Yanikoglu, 2008) 
Kholmatov et al. have realized the correlation attack against a database of 400 fuzzy vaults 
(200 matching pairs) of their own making (Kholmatov & Yanikoglu, 2008). Fig. 6 shows an 
example of their experimental results. If two vaults which are generated from the same 
fingerprint are correlated, many real minutiae are obtained, while two vaults from different 
fingerprints do not have enough real minutiae in their common area to reconstruct the true 
polynomial. They reported that 59% of them were successfully unlocked with two matching 
vaults. 
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4.3 Fast polynomial reconstruction attack 
The exhaustive search can be performed much faster than the brute-force search by using 
the method of the polynomial reconstruction described in Section 3.3. If a vault contains two 
more real points than the degree of the polynomial (i.e., ne ≥ k + 2), the true polynomial can 
be successfully reconstructed. The polynomial reconstruction time depends on the number 
of the real points and the number of the chaff points. The more chaff points and the less real 
points it contains, the more time it takes to reconstruct the polynomial. The process for the 
Fast Polynomial Reconstruction (FPR) attack algorithm is as follows. 
First, k points are selected from nr points with real and chaff points mixed. Second, the 
augmented matrix is obtained, and is reduced into the following row-echelon form. 
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Third, if there exist the same values among ( 1) ( 1)1 , , r
k k
k nv v
+ +
+ A , we reconstruct the polynomial 
with the k points selected and one of the two points which have the same v(k+1) value, and 
then, compare it with the true polynomial. 
As in the brute-force attack, we can estimate the number of the Lagrange interpolations to 
be performed. First, the (k + 1) points are chosen, and if at least one of the remaining (nr – k – 
1) points lies on the line through the (k + 1) points, the Lagrange interpolation is performed 
regardless of whether all these points are real points or not. Let us assume that the order of 
the Galois field is 2n, then the probability that at least one of the (nr – k – 1) points lies on that 
line is  
 
1
1
1 1
2
rn k
n
− −⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (20) 
Since the average number of trials until the (k + 1) real points are drawn is C(nr, k + 1) / C(ne, 
k + 1), the average number of the Lagrange interpolations to be performed until the real 
polynomial is reconstructed is as follows. 
 
1
( , 1) 1
( ) 1 1
( , 1) 2
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r
L n
e
C n k
E N
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 (21) 
Since 2n is a very large number, equation (20) is very small. Hence, the Lagrange 
interpolation needs to be performed in a limited number of times. In addition, let NG be the 
number of executions of the Gaussian elimination of equation (19), then, the expected value 
of NG is as follows. 
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It is smaller than the expected number of the Lagrange interpolation of the brute-force 
attack in equation (18). Also, the execution time per combination of the FPR attack is much 
faster than that of the brute-force attack. Therefore, this attack is more efficient than the 
brute-force attack. Experimental results show the efficiency of this attack method. For 
example, if n = 20, k = 9, nr = 230, and ne = 30, the average numbers of executions of 
Lagrange interpolation and the recursive formula are 
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It is considerable reduction compared to the brute-force attack. The number of the Lagrange 
interpolation is reduced by the order of 104. 
4.4 Experimental results 
To compare the three attack algorithms mentioned in the previous section (the brute-force 
attack, the correlation attack, and the FPR attack), we used DB1 of FVC2002 (Maio et al., 
2002), which consists of 8 impressions for each of the 100 distinct fingers. From among 8 
impressions, the first impressions of each fingerprint were used for the brute-force attack 
and the FPR attack. For the correlation attack, on the other hand, the first and the second 
impressions were used to get the correlated minutiae when the correlation reached its peak. 
Once the matched minutiae are obtained, the polynomial reconstruction is performed by the 
brute-force search. We chose the number of chaff minutiae as 200, and the degree of the 
polynomial as 7. The tests are performed to find out whether the attack algorithms can 
reconstruct the true polynomial or not within 24 hours.  
The results of the three attack algorithms are summarized in Table 6. The success rate is 
defined by the ratio of the number of successes to the total trials. The Correlation attack is 
known to be very efficient attack method for FFV. However, the brute-force attack and the 
FPR attack turn out to be much more efficient methods. Especially, the FPR attack cracked 
100% of the vaults, and the attack time is only half of that of the brute-force attack. 
 
Attack Method Brute-force Correlation FPR 
Success Rate (%) 95 17 100 
No. Lagrange (NL) 3.9 × 107 4.4 × 107 2.0 × 105 
E(NL) 6.6 × 107 2.4 × 108 9.6 × 104 
No. Gaussian Elimination (NG) - - 9.2 × 106 
E(NG) - - 2.1 × 107 
Time (sec) 4,562 5,089 2,424 
Table 6. The summary of the three attack algorithms (brute-force attack, correlation attack, 
and the FPR attack) 
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For the experiments of the correlation attack, after correlating two vaults, 23 tests extract 
more than 8 real minutiae, and perform polynomial reconstruction. The average correlation 
time is 42 seconds. Among 23 tests, 6 tests cannot reconstruct the true polynomial within 24 
hours, so 17% of the vaults are cracked by the correlation attack. On the other hand, 100% of 
the vaults are cracked by the FPR attack within 24 hours, and the average time is 2,424 
seconds, while the average time for the brute-force attack is 4,562 seconds. Since the fixed 
numbers of chaff minutiae are inserted, the smaller the number of real minutiae is, the more 
time the polynomial reconstruction requires. For the brute-force attack and the correlation 
attack, the attack time is proportional to the actual number of the Lagrange interpolations. 
Also, the time for FPR attack depends mainly on the number of the Gaussian eliminations 
which is computed by equation (13). 
Fig. 7 shows the histogram of the actual number of Lagrange interpolation and its expected 
value for the case of successful attack. Although the two histograms have some fluctuations, 
they have similar distributions. Therefore, we can predict the attack time based on the 
expected number of the Lagrange interpolations when the number of chaff points is more 
than 200 or the degree of polynomial is greater than 7. In our experiments, the Lagrange 
interpolation times for the polynomial degree of 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are 0.14, 0.28, 0.71, 1.6, 
3.9 and 9.8 milliseconds, respectively. Also, the Gaussian elimination times for 200 and 400 
chaff points are 0.26 and 0.52 milliseconds, respectively. The expected numbers of the 
Lagrange interpolations and the Gaussian eliminations can be calculated from the equations 
(18), (21) and (22). Table 7 shows the predicted time for the brute-force attack and the FPR 
attack. The security of FFV can be strengthened by adding more chaff points and by 
increasing the degree of polynomial. From the experimental result in the previous section, 
however, the more chaff points are added and the higher degree of polynomial is used, the 
recognition accuracy degrades significantly. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Histograms of the actual number of the Lagrange interpolation and its expected 
value 
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No. Chaff Polynomial Degree Brute-force FPR 
200 
8 10 hours 1 hour 
9 9 days 9 hours 
10 213 days 4 days 
11 14 years 35 days 
12 369 years 1 year 
400 
7 3 days 18 hours 
8 113 days 13 days 
9 14 years 214 days 
10 595 years 11 years 
11 26,964 years 200 years 
12 1,365,157 years 4,172 years 
Table 7. Predicted time for the brute-force attack and the FPR attack 
5. Conclusion 
Biometrics is an efficient and convenient method for authenticating persons’ identities. 
However, once the biometric template is compromised, the user’s identity is permanently 
stolen. Hence, many scientists have studied to protect the biometric templates against attack. 
Fuzzy vault gave a promising solution to user privacy and fingerprint template security 
problems. Inspired from fuzzy vault, fuzzy fingerprint vault was proposed to securely store 
fingerprint minutiae in a database. However, there are two problems for the fuzzy 
fingerprint vault to be used in real world. First, by using brute-force search, the polynomial 
cannot be reconstructed in real time. Second, fuzzy vault is vulnerable to correlation attack.  
In this work, we provided solutions to these problems. First, we proposed a fast polynomial 
reconstruction algorithm, which speed up the exhaustive search by using the Consistency 
Theorem. To reduce the execution time, it determines the candidate sets with chaff points by 
using Gaussian elimination and excludes them from the reconstruction trial. Since Gaussian 
elimination is a time-consuming process, we have found a recursive formula to perform 
Gaussian elimination effectively. We confirmed that the proposed algorithm can be 
performed in real time even at the worst case. 
Second, fuzzy vault was found out to be cracked quickly by the correlation attack in 2008. 
The correlation attack acquires a minutiae set with many real minutiae by correlating two 
vaults. However, if the minutia set contains a little more chaff minutiae, the attack can 
hardly crack the vault. In our experiments, brute-force attack was rather more efficient. In 
addition, the fast polynomial reconstruction algorithm is used to crack the vault. The FPR 
attack algorithm records 100% attack rate. Therefore, fuzzy fingerprint vault cannot store 
fingerprint minutiae securely anymore. Furthermore, if we add more chaff points and use 
higher degree of polynomial to strengthen the security, in return, the recognition accuracy 
degrades significantly. Therefore, a solution for enhancing security of FFV is required. One 
possible solution is one-time template (Ueshige & Sakurai, 2006) whose notion is from one-
time password. If we can define a one-time template for fingerprint and the corresponding 
transform, the security of fingerprint authentication system can be enhanced innovatively. 
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In the recent years, a number of recognition and authentication systems based on biometric measurements
have been proposed. Algorithms and sensors have been developed to acquire and process many different
biometric traits. Moreover, the biometric technology is being used in novel ways, with potential commercial and
practical implications to our daily activities. The key objective of the book is to provide a collection of
comprehensive references on some recent theoretical development as well as novel applications in biometrics.
The topics covered in this book reflect well both aspects of development. They include biometric sample
quality, privacy preserving and cancellable biometrics, contactless biometrics, novel and unconventional
biometrics, and the technical challenges in implementing the technology in portable devices. The book consists
of 15 chapters. It is divided into four sections, namely, biometric applications on mobile platforms, cancelable
biometrics, biometric encryption, and other applications. The book was reviewed by editors Dr. Jucheng Yang
and Dr. Norman Poh. We deeply appreciate the efforts of our guest editors: Dr. Girija Chetty, Dr. Loris Nanni,
Dr. Jianjiang Feng, Dr. Dongsun Park and Dr. Sook Yoon, as well as a number of anonymous reviewers.
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